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Feature Essay
Summer 2014
Childers, Christopher CIVIL WAR SESQUICENTENNIAL: The Political Crisis
of the 1850s and the Irrepressible Historians.
The political crisis of the Union—the means by which unity and comity
disintegrated and the American people descended into war with themselves—has
fascinated and perplexed students of the Civil War era since the battlefields
became silent. The seminal question “What caused the Civil War?" naturally
leads students of the Civil War era to the political crises of the 1850s. And, in
turn, historians have sought over the 150 years since the war to find ways to
explain how the war came. In many respects, the historiographical battle over the
politics of slavery and the coming of the war has hinged on a major theme. Just
as Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas sparred over the moral
implications of slavery and the sectional crisis, so too have historians fought
over how morality fits into the broader narrative of antebellum politics and the
coming of the Civil War.
Scholars have long debated whether the Civil War constituted an
“irrepressible conflict" or a “repressible conflict" between North and South.
Though North and South increasingly diverged in the 19th century, largely as a
result of the decline of slavery in the North and its perpetuation and expansion in
the South, describing the Civil War as an irrepressible conflict suggests the
inevitability of conflict. Many historians have shown that the Civil War did not
become inevitable at some point earlier than 1861; indeed, options for sectional
rapprochement existed almost up to that very point. Nevertheless, scholars have
found unmistakable evidence of significant differences that complicate the story
of the antebellum political crisis.
Northerners and Southerners lived within different societies by virtue of
slavery. Slavery evolved into more than a system of labor in the South; indeed,
by the antebellum era, it had become a major component of the social, cultural,
and political life of the region and its inhabitants. The same set of circumstances
simply did not exist in the North, as slavery disappeared in the region over the
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course of the early republic and early antebellum eras. Yet at the same time, the
two sections shared much in common: a shared national government, a basic
shared set of cultural values and norms (excluding slavery), and modes of
commerce and communication, among others. The sameness of experience
seemed to hold the sections together even as slavery served as a divisive issue in
the nation.
Understanding how students of the Civil War era have grappled with these
ideas and sought to explain them in a coherent narrative explain how we
understand the coming of the war today. The irrepressible conflict argument
originated before the war with the famous pronouncements of men like William
Seward and Abraham Lincoln and reemerged with the work of historian James
Ford Rhodes in his seven-volume work The History of the United States from the
Compromise of 1850 (1893-1906). To Rhodes and his students, slavery alone
caused the breakdown of American politics in the 1850s and led to the Civil
War. Rhodes emphasized the moral aspects of the slavery question as well as the
institution’s social and cultural impact on the divergence of North and South by
the 1850s. To Rhodes and a generation of scholars trained in his work, the
inevitability of the Civil War seemed remarkably apparent.
By the late 1920s, however, a new generation of scholars began to challenge
the self-evident inevitability of the war and the primacy of slavery as its cause.
Inspired in part by Charles and Mary Beard’s economic determinism, which
emphasized slavery as an economic institution and a source of labor, and by a
general post-World War I disillusionment with war, politics, and ideology, a
group of historians—who would become known as the revisionists—challenged
the theme of an irrepressible conflict. For a generation, the revisionist historians
argued that the Civil War was a repressible conflict. A paucity of pragmatic
leadership had led to a crisis of governance; compromise failed as abolitionists
and proslavery fanatics (and the revisionists appropriated most of their blame to
the former) divided the political system and the nation over the issue of slavery.
The revisionists tended to dismiss the moral strictures of the abolitionists as
fanaticism, while lauding those willing to compromise on the slavery question as
pragmatists.
The revisionists, most notably represented by James G. Randall and Avery
Craven, responded to the moral condemnation of slavery by arguing instead that
a blundering generation of leaders had failed to achieve sectional harmony,
thereby leading the nation into a civil war that could have been avoided if
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northerners had acted more diplomatically. The revisionists seemed incredulous
that the politicians of the 1850s were so shortsighted as to brook disunion over
what, for the revisionists themselves, seemed like issues ripe for compromise.
They sought to explain the superheated rhetoric of the 1850s in psychological
terms by blaming the disintegration of politics and compromise on a small group
of fanatics who frenzied politicians and citizens in Washington and across the
nation.
By the 1950s and 1960s, the revisionist school had collapsed amidst the
resurgence of the civil rights movement and America’s grappling with race as a
paramount political issue. A new generation of historians sought to reaffirm the
primacy of slavery and its moral implications for American society and politics
by refuting the revisionists’ claims that slavery really had not caused the war in
the first place. In some respects, students of the Civil War era returned to a moral
interpretation akin to Rhodes. That said, throughout the 1960s and 1970s,
scholars looked for new ways to explain the erosion of the American political
system and the coming of the Civil War. Some saw the fall of the Whig Party,
the disintegration of the Democrats, and the creation of the Republican Party as a
watershed moment of instability at a time in which Americans desperately
needed stability. But whereas some historians identified slavery as the cause of
the collapse, others looked to “ethnocultural" factors such as immigration,
nativism, and other cultural differences in an increasingly growing and diverse
nation.
Today, historians frequently borrow from these schools to explain the
political crisis of the 1850s. The contours of modern interpretations of the
coming of the Civil War fall within a general narrative from which historians
branch out into new fields of inquiry. The North and South had bitter and
profound differences by the 1850s that increasingly tested the stability and
permanence of the political system. The South remained wedded to its peculiar
institution, while northerners increasingly saw slavery as a moral and social evil.
Both sections sought to use the political arena as a means to protect—and
perpetuate—their respective agendas. Northerners increasingly saw slavery as a
threat to northern free labor, especially in the emerging West, and sought to
circumscribe the limits of slavery’s expansion through a variety of means, most
notably through the use of popular sovereignty. The popular sovereignty doctrine
promised to let the people of the territories themselves decide whether to permit
or prohibit slavery, thereby removing the issue from congressional purview via a
democratic solution. Alas, popular sovereignty as expressed in the
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Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 nearly destroyed the Democratic Party and gave
rise to a new political organization dedicated to free soil, free labor, and free
men: the Republican Party.
The formation of the Republican Party, coupled with a relentless
demographic shift that saw much larger population growth in the North rather
than the South led to a political crisis for southerners. The South had long held
more than its share of power in the federal government by virtue of the
three-fifths compromise, which essentially made the Senate a bulwark of
southern protection. By mid-century, however, the South had become less
powerful as more free states entered the Union. The conflict over slavery in the
territories, and indeed the conflict over union, largely rested on the future of
sectional power in the halls of government. A small but vocal group of southern
nationalists, as early as the late 1840s and early 1850s, began calculating the
value of the Union to southern interests.
Beyond the differences that slavery had engendered, however, a majority of
northerners and southerners remained resolute in preserving the Union and
believed that the political system could achieve results. After all, for several
generations the great compromisers of Congress had smoothed over sectional
crises one by one. Both sides blustered mightily, but in the end they brokered a
compromise. In 1820, 1833, and 1850, for example, both sections overcame
threats of disunion and compromised on the point of slavery. The Compromise
of 1850, however, foreshadowed the increasing difficulty of compromising in a
nation becoming more rigidly for and against slavery. The historian David M.
Potter argued compellingly that the 1850 accord represented an “armistice"
rather than a compromise, since neither side had to agree to provisions that they
found unacceptable in order to seal the compromise. Instead, the compromise
deferred to a later date the need to answer definitively some basic questions
concerning the Union. For many, that date came four years later with the
incredibly contentious (and narrow) passage of Illinois senator Stephen A.
Douglas’s Kansas-Nebraska Act in Congress. President Franklin Pierce had
made support of the bill an article of faith for Democrats. The intransigence of
Pierce and Douglas, coupled with the demands of southerners to repeal the
Missouri Compromise line as part of the bill, led to a major split within the party
itself, as disaffected “Independent Democrats" sought refuge in the nascent
Republican Party. Parties and politics shifted dramatically amidst this political
earthquake.
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The fragility of compromise and the increasingly shrill rhetoric from ultra
proslavery and antislavery forces, however, must not obscure the fact that
sufficient resolve existed among northerners and southerners to preserve the
Union. Compromise did not hide the differences between North and South, but
the commonality of national experience and union prevailed. For a time, the
nation even weathered Bleeding Kansas, Bleeding Sumner, and Dred Scott v.
Sandford. By 1860, however, things had changed in ways ominous for the cause
of union. The debacle of Kansas and John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry had
inflamed and scared southerners, while northerners resolutely rejected slavery
and the “Slave Power." Abraham Lincoln won election to the presidency without
a single southern electoral vote. The election of 1860 marked a shattering blow
to the South and its political power. Many southerners feared that Lincoln’s
election jeopardized the South’s influence within the Union, and consequently,
they possessed no means to protect what they perceived as their rights.
By the secession winter of 1860-1861, many southerners stood ready to
leave the Union, but many others wanted to wait and see what came of the
Lincoln presidency. The presence of a significant group of conditional unionists
in southern states amid increasingly louder calls for secession showed that war
had not become inevitable or that conflict was irrepressible. Many northerners
and southerners genuinely hoped once again for sectional rapprochement and
believed that political solutions remained possible. The war came in 1861 as
compromise failed and a standoff over possession of federal property came to
conflict on April 12, 1861. The election of Lincoln had led seven southern state
secession conventions to declare the bonds of Union dissolved. But even here,
the stark divisions of sectional politics remained. Four southern states waited
until Lincoln’s call for troops after the shelling of Fort Sumter. Clearly, the
politics of union—and indeed disunion—remained intricate and complicated
even past the point at which the first shots of the Civil War were fired.
Christopher Childers is an assistant professor of history at Benedictine
College in Atchison, Kansas. He is the author of The Failure of Popular
Sovereignty: Slavery, Manifest Destiny, and the Radicalization of Southern
Politics (University Press of Kansas, 2012). He was the editor of the Civil War
Book Review from 2006 to 2009.
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